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Abstract: 
This chapter examines the intellectual phenomenon of theoretical aversion in legal 
scholarship, as it specifically manifests in environmental law. It first demonstrates 
how a proposed turn to methodology seeks to constrain theory within the strict 
contours of an epistemology that serves to support the scientific aspirations of legal 
scholarship. This notion of theory as epistemology is in turn linked to environmental 
law’s overwhelming concern with controlling the relation between scholarship and 
action for the purpose of constituting itself as valid expert authority in the context of 
contemporary environmental discursive practices. Building on the critique of this view 
of theory as a pure research design element, the chapter articulates a different 
perspective, recovered from theoretical excess and inspired by the life and work of 
Michel Foucault, which merges the distinction between scholarship and action via 
the – correct – use of the metaphor of the ‘tool box’, often mishandled in Foucaultian 
scholarship. By reorienting this metaphor, the chapter argues that the contestation 
over the precise role of theory within environmental law relates to the historical 
evolution of the current role of the legal researcher who is expected to function solely 
as an expert on environmental change. The task of critical environmental law thus 
becomes to resist the assigned role within the established regime of environmental 
truth and to make novel and expansive contributions of the ‘tool box’ of 
environmental thought and practice. 
Keywords: theoretical aversion, methodology, critical environmental law, Michel 
Foucault, tool box, intellectual history 
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‘What rather threw me at the time was the 
fact that the question I was posing totally failed to 
interest those to whom I addressed it. They regarded 
it as a problem which was politically unimportant and 
epistemologically vulgar.’1 
1. REPULSION 
It is revealing for the future directions of legal scholarship that a prominent 
handbook on legal research methodologies, written for an audience of aspiring PhD 
scholars and early career academics, diagnoses and partly seeks to ‘dispel this fear 
or unease with “theory”’.2 The source of these emotions is never fully explained, but 
there is a sense that being called a theorist should be unwelcome;3 an intimation that 
‘particularly what some call “capital T” theory’,4 the ‘arcane preserve of a small group 
of self-identified… Theorists’,5 is used ‘to mystify and oversell mediocre ideas, or 
simply to sound clever’.6 It seems that a mysterious malaise lingers in the halls of the 
late modern law school, transmitted through dangerous intellectual contact. 
Symptoms may include mystification, abstraction and generalisation. Be careful and 
                                            
1 Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power and Knowledge: Selected writing 
and Interviews 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980), 109 
2 Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 
2011), 5 
3 ‘We rejected the use of the word ‘theory’ alone because in our experience many legal scholars… are 
uncomfortable with expressly identifying themselves as theorists’, at ibid, 5. 
4 Ibid, 1 
5 Ibid, 1 
6 Ibid, 2 
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strike all references to promiscuous and self-indulgent scholarship from your CV, lest 
you become infected. 
2. MALAISE: CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 
This malaise has had different names, some more well-known than others: 
originally critical legal studies, but also critical legal theory (‘with or without 
modifiers’),7 post-empiricist sociology of law,8 general jurisprudence,9 and even 
continental philosophy of law.10 A product of 1960s counter-culture students and 
activists becoming legal academics in the 1970s, it has been called a ‘heady brew’ of 
the ‘wilder aspects of American legal realism, 1960s Marxism, and […] 
postmodernism’.11 But the caricature of self-indulgent theoretical meditations on the 
relation between law and politics peppered by vacuous neologisms derived from 
‘continental philosophy’ is not always accurate; a central focus of critical legal theory 
has consistently been the modalities of thinking and acting adopted by the legal 
                                            
7 Mark Tushnet, ‘Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States’ (2005) 13 The Journal 
of Political Philosophy 99 
8 Austin Sarat, ‘Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a Post-
Empiricist Sociology of Law’ (1990) 15 Law & Social Inquiry 155 
9 Costas Douzinas and Adam Geary, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice (Hart 
Publishing 2005), 18-42 
10 Nick Smith, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue on Continental Philosophy of Law ’ (2009) 42 
Continental Philosophy Review 1 
11 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Legal Quarterly 
Review 632, 638 
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profession,12 and in particular the responsibility and role of legal academics within 
the university, as well as more broadly in society. 
Critical legal studies went ‘bust’ in the 1990s in North American academia,13 
and only re-emerged as a politically restrained ‘law and humanities’ school.14 Other 
schools of legal thought, such as socio-legal studies (or ‘law and society’ to give it its 
North American name), comparative law and more recently transnational law have 
flourished by constraining theory in the pursuit of their own substantive research 
programmes. Indeed, their current healthy state benefits at least partially from both 
the emigration of an older generation of critical legal scholars and a younger 
generation of scholars that have grown up with this fear and aversion to critical legal 
theory, under a series of intellectual and material pressures stemming from the 
changing modus operandi of what has now become the ‘neoliberal university’15 and 
the resultant alterations in the priorities of the various funding bodies and research 
councils. Despite these diminutions and abandonment, critical legal theory remains. 
                                            
12 I.e. including practitioners and academics. For an excellent diagram of the relation between legal 
research and legal profession see Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and 
Method (Hart Publishing 2014), 34-42. For a survey of the early contestations by the US ‘critical legal 
studies’ school of the ‘practices and ideology of the legal profession’ see Tushnet, 100-101. 
13 Robert C. Ellickson, ‘Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study’ (2000) 29 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 517, 525 and 528 
14 Peter Goodrich, ‘Law by Other Means’ 10 Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 111. For a quick 
dismissal of this turn to literature for renewed direction see Costas Douzinas, ‘A Short History of the 
British Critical Legal Conference or, the Responsibility of the Critic’ (2014) 25 Law & Critique 187, 193 
15 On this notion see Stephen J. Ball, ‘Living in the Neo-liberal University’ (2015) 50 European Journal 
of Education 258 
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How then can the aspiring young researchers in the field of environmental 
law, which are still drawn to such unsettling meditations and critiques stay on ‘the 
straight and narrow’, and protect themselves from the spread of this seeming 
malaise? As the current orthodoxy will have it, there is a type of ‘safe’ theory – 
without the capital T – that can lead to valid erudition, as opposed to self-indulgent 
oblivion. Under this safe schema, arcane ostentation is to be dropped; they can 
understand theory simply as a foundational design element in the process of 
conceiving legal research projects, as another term for methodology. They then will 
be able to be guided by the understanding that ‘every legal research project begins 
from a theoretical basis or bases, whether these are articulated or not’,16 without 
fearing that their scholarship would be affected by the malaise of capital-T theory.  
Choosing this ‘theoretical basis’ will in turn determine the different 
conceptions and meanings attached to law both as an ideal and as practice, the 
types of questions deemed worthy of being posed and problems deemed worthy of 
being tackled, as well as the types of acceptable sources, materials and methods to 
be deployed. In short, what will protect the legal scholar is the equation of theory with 
making choices from a shopping list of available theoretical bases and 
methodological frameworks, with a process of reflective research design that safely 
structures the possible fields of enquiry for the legal scholar. 
This turn towards methodology, in its almost self-evident common sense 
character, its quasi-religious element of renouncing bad influences and its careerist 
adoption of best research practice, is further analysed in the next section. The 
particular focus of analysis then shifts to the operation of this turn in environmental 
                                            
16 Cryer and others, 5 
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law, where legal scholarship’s fear of theory becomes intertwined with ecology’s 
suspicion against theorising in the face of environmental catastrophe. In the fourth 
section of this chapter, charting the mutual reinforcement between the two types of 
aversion ultimately exposes that the repulsion is driven by the field’s very own 
particular admiration for the scientific model of enquiry and the concomitant 
authoritative access to political truth it provides in contemporary society. 
By referring to the work of Michel Foucault, regarded as one of most 
dangerous influences leading legal researchers down the path of critical legal theory, 
the chapter further demonstrates that the rejection of critical legal theory also 
constitutes a rejection of a particular configuration of the relation between 
scholarship and action; of a certain political role of the legal researcher within the 
politics of change. However, the section also renders clear some of critical 
scholarship’s own fetishes and complicity in its own downfall, focusing on the 
misappropriations of the concept of the Foucaultian ‘toolbox’. 
Finally, based on the Foucaultian concepts of the regime of truth and 
historical discontinuity, the chapter examines certain contradictions in the self-
perceived responsibility of environmental law scholarship that the conception of 
theory as methodology is attempting to hide. From this analysis, the chapter 
concludes that the primary task for the environmental law researcher that wants to 
practically (re)navigate the relationship between scholarship and action, without 
succumbing to the fear of theory, is a difficult engagement with the idea of change. 
3. PURITY: THEORY QUA EPISTEMOLOGY 
In an interconnected globalised world in a continuing state of environmental 
crisis and with ever decreasing margins for taking action to prevent catastrophe, 
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environmental lawyers are not expected to be theorists. The fear and aversion to 
theory is heightened when, under the influence of the ‘Science Wars’ of the 1980s 
and 1990s, the latter is deemed the binary opposite of both scientific reason and 
rational, decisive action; a dreaded and derided abstract ‘theorising’ akin to fatal 
disassembling in the face of ecological crisis, or –even worse – the facilitator of 
ecological denialism and a ‘fifth column’ weakening the environmental cause from 
within. When the stakes appear so significant to relate to the welfare of the whole 
planet and all humanity, theoretical temptations must be kept in check at all costs. 
The message is often starkly clear: lay off Donna Haraway and pick up Francis Crick 
instead.17 This is fertile ground for the full expression of theoretical aversion, and 
environmental law now forms a key element of the inoculation of legal research 
against theory. 
The authors of a meticulous and much-debated study of how environmental 
law scholarship should assess itself as a scientific field of enquiry present an 
intriguing starting point for a notion of ‘mature’ legal research: that there is a need to 
separate between ‘the “structural sources” of our scholarly problems’ and ‘legal 
solutions to environmental problems’.18 They further explain this as the need to 
differentiate between environmental law as a course of legislative and policy reform 
underpinned by ecological values that seeks to achieve certain environmental goals, 
                                            
17 Michael E. Soule and Gary Lease (eds), Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern 
Deconstruction (Island Press 1995), 3. 
18 Elisabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental 
Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213, 218 
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and environmental law as a mode of scholarly enquiry with its own theories, methods 
and problems, (i.e. its own ‘structure’).19 
We thus find ourselves back on firm positivist ground, where the interpretation 
of the law is to be kept separate from the pursuit of political goals through legal 
reform; basic science kept separate from applied technology; theory kept separate 
from practice. In this perfect marriage of environmental law and science unified by 
theoretical aversion,20 we are then left instead with research method as the single 
metric21 of what constitutes mature legal scholarship on environment: scholarship 
that ‘deploys some thought-out (emphasis in the original) method’.22 In other words, 
when is theoretical reflection not abstract theorising? Answer: when it relates to 
research methodology and scholarly problems – as opposed to political positions. 
According to such a methodological path for attaining maturity as a legal scholar, the 
proposition quoted in the previous section of this article is in practice reworded as: 
‘every legal research project starts from a methodological (emphasis added) basis or 
bases’. When theory is transformed into methodology, it -in effect- becomes purified 
from the bad toxins of normative biases and value judgements. It mutates into a type 
of pure epistemology, a theory of scientific knowledge – i.e. of the correct methods 
by which valid knowledge is acquired within a field of scientific study. By 
                                            
19 Ibid, 217 
20 The joined-up aversion manifests in the authors’ steadfast avoidance of terms, such as theoretical 
or philosophical. They prefer the unwieldy term ‘jurisprudential environmental law scholarship’, when 
setting out their typology of environmental law scholarship. Ibid, 21 
21 The authors explicitly mention David Feldman, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship ’ (1989) 52 Modern 
Law Review 498 as a basis for this definition, but leave out his engagement with theory, legal or 
otherwise, as well as his critique of the limitations of the scientific model. 
22 Fisher and others, 217 
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consequence, any discussion of theoretical bases of legal research is not 
distinguishable from the discussion of its epistemological bases. 
Such an understanding of legal epistemology is manifested – and the notion 
of theory qua epistemology is also in turn confirmed – in the conception of theory as 
‘theoretical framework’ that supports the production of mature legal scholarship. The 
framework constitutes the methodological and conceptual scaffolding that will 
securely underpin the construction of a proper legal enquiry; pruning obstacles and 
removing dangers to its scientific standing, and preparing it for its entry into the 
separate, applied phase. Theory qua epistemology thus becomes the subservient 
under-labourer (as opposed to the subversive other) of legal scholarship, restricted 
and palatable, domesticated in a ‘structural’, albeit auxiliary, role. Theory is the 
assistant scaffold, to be removed once the actual building itself (the legal enquiry) is 
completed. 
Yet this conception appears to underplay the possibility that scholarship in the 
humanities broadly conceived – by its very nature – also requires theoretical clarity 
as to the social, cultural, ethical and other contexts – and effects – of the idea, 
phenomenon or problem being studied actually constitutes. This simple possibility is 
behind the long-standing concern of critical theory with the self-evidences and 
acquiesces on which our systems of thought rely. 
This path of purity appears to be working. Theoretical scholarship has 
generally not been widely recognised as a viable path for environmental law 
scholars. ‘Doctrinal’, ‘policy-orientated’ and ‘sociolegal’ approaches form the 
standard classification in the UK.23 In the field of international environmental law the 
                                            
23 For quick definitions see Richard Macrory, ‘'Maturity and Methodology': A Reflection’ (2009) 21 
Journal of Environmental Law 251, 252. 
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latter can also be replaced by an ‘explanatory approach’, underpinned by a form of 
international relations pointedly called political science, as opposed to political 
theory.24 It is also worthwhile to note that self-identified environmental lawyers have 
been largely absent from the ‘new approaches’ or ‘critical international law’ school of 
thought.25 In short, theoretical scholarship on the environment written by legal 
scholars is generally quite rare.26 
4. OBSESSION: SCIENCE AS ASPIRATION 
The proponents of this putative epistemological turn appear to advocate 
taking a pause from ‘looking for legal solutions to environmental problems’27, as well 
as the past interminable ontological debates about the nature of environmental law,28 
                                            
24 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 
2010), 8-9 
25 E.g. notice the absence of the environment from Anne Orford (ed), International Law and its Others 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) and Jose Maria Beneyoto and others (eds), New Approaches to 
International Law: The European and American Experiences (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012). 
26 But not entirely absent, see Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed), Law and Ecology: New 
Environmental Legal Foundations (Routledge 2011), or the work of some of the contributors to this 
handbook. 
27 Fisher and others, 218 
28 E.g. Todd S. Aagaard, ‘Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy’ (2010) 
95 Cornell Law Review 221; Macrory. For a comprehensive, albeit centred on the North American 
context, survey of the debate see A. Dan Tarlock, ‘Is There a There in Environmental Law?’ (2004) 19 
Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 213. On the extension of this debate to the international 
level cf Patricia Birnie, Alan E. Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 
(3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009), 1-12 and Philippe Sands and others, Principles of 
International Environmental Law (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012), 3-20. 
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to consciously address and reflect on the methodological challenges that seemingly 
prevent the coherent maturation of the scholarly field. 
Any environmental law scholar that has faced awkward questions about (not) 
saving the planet from friends and family at various social gatherings can appreciate 
this notion of a pure academic discipline kept distinct from the applied political 
project of achieving environmental protection through the force of law. Quite simply, 
it may be a relief to accept that environmental law scholarship cannot always be the 
equivalent of environmental law. Such an absolution of responsibility of course 
serves as an enticing lure pulling towards a ‘healthy’ epistemology and away from 
the tortuous malaise of theory. The question then becomes, is the lure also a siren 
call? 
The intellectual value of attaining some type of clarity between scholarship 
and action on the environment is accepted in many scholarly quarters, including by 
theoretical scholarship that has been called critical environmental law.29 Such a 
broad acceptance can give the impression that the path by which such clarity is to be 
achieved is straightforward or that a clear division between scholarship and action is 
desirable by all, both ‘sensible’ legal researchers and ‘arcane’ critical theorists. But 
the path is actually determined by the proximity to the scientific model of enquiry. 
The very mimicry of a binary division between basic ‘scholarship’ and applied ‘action’ 
on the basis of an epistemological conception of theory as theory of knowledge only 
serves a project of continuing rapprochement between the legal method and 
scientific method. 
                                            
29 See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 3-4 on how the failure to theorise the connection between law 
and ecology in terms of anything other than a blueprint for action fails to create the necessary 
distance from the ‘processes and goals of environmental law’. 
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Thus, it ultimately supports the growing self-conception of legal scholarship as 
a form of social scientific enquiry, underpinned by appropriate methodological 
scaffolds and theoretical frameworks. This in turn further reinforces the classical 
positivist method of identifying the law, and thus the analytical idea that legal enquiry 
must aspire to and approximate as much as possible the model of scientific enquiry. 
Under this view, the legal researcher should function as a type of legal scientist, not 
to be influenced by the political biases of either the ecological movement or critical 
legal theory. In the end, such a conception of mature scholarship aligns legal with 
scientific positivism. It is clearly reliant on an ideal of scientific enquiry, of basic, pure 
science to be kept separate from applied technology. The mutual reinforcement of 
the two positivisms is implicit and unacknowledged in the context of the turn to 
epistemology. 
This turn reinforces the field’s pre-existing scientism, the reliance on scientific 
reason as the provider of the theoretical basis for a legal research project, and 
generally on scientific enquiry as an ideal and a prototype for all scholarship. This 
tendency is further embraced, from the empiricism of social sciences to the 
modelling of economics, particularly within environmental law scholarship, given its 
strong ‘bond’ with science.30 While it is argued that ‘environmental law as an object 
of scholarship and research does not yield easily to a single paradigm, methodology 
or explanation’31 because of the complexity of environmental problems, the scientific 
origins and natural science background of environmental thought in fact provide a 
single deep structure that underlies legal enquiry. Under the sign of environmental 
law, legal and scientific positivism are bound together. 
                                            
30 A. Dan Tarlock, ‘Who Owns Science?’ (2002) 10 Penn State Environmental Law Review 135 
31 Fisher and others, 225 
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Therefore, the field’s famed interdisciplinarity and its wide choice of available 
methodologies is not effectively an open research design choice, as the proponents 
of theory as methodology are wont to indicate. If the researcher wants validity or 
even attention to be paid to his work, certain methodologies are clearly superior to 
others; the more the distance traversed from the accoutrements of the scientific 
method, the lower the chances of being accepted – or indeed acceptable. Scientism 
guarantees that the panacea of interdisciplinarity is not such an open or holistic 
endeavour; if it is a call for other disciplines to enter environmental law scholarship, it 
is a call directed only to those that have attained or are in the process of attaining the 
status of science. For example, it can be considered that law and economics 
constitutes the scholarly manifestation of a neoliberal political agenda,32 and thus 
almost the mirror opposite of the perceived leftist political bias of critical legal theory. 
Yet we can safely presume that economic theory is not part of the arsenal of ‘capital-
T’ Theory that constitutes a malaise for legal scholarship. In fact, the enshrinement 
of both scientific and economic explanation as the primary source of authority and 
legitimacy in the field is already accepted.33 
For the critical environmental lawyer therefore, submitting to the lure of 
separating scholarship and action is, in fact, a siren call. At best, it leads to co-
optation and the excising of the inappropriate kinds of theory; at worst, it marks the 
scholar with the yellow star of arcane theory. The goal of the application of the 
epistemological turn to environmental law is therefore not solely the attainment of a 
                                            
32 McCrudden, 640 
33 Stephen Humphreys and Yoriko Otomo, ‘Theorising International Environmental Law’ in Anne 
Orford, Florian Hoffmann and Martin Clark (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2016), 2 
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higher quality of research method for the professional maturation of an aspiring 
academic field. It is, additionally, an act of establishing control over the relationships 
between truth and error and between scholarship and action. The epistemological 
field’s self-definition of its role in society is at stake. ‘Immature’ scholarship is not 
related solely to the absence of methodological self-reflection, but, additionally, to 
the potential involvement of researchers, in their dangerous guise as followers of the 
wrong type of theoretical frameworks, into various causes outside the scientific field 
that would dilute its standing and authority. 
The effectiveness of this epistemological turn lies in the fact that the 
relationship between scholarship and action – whether it is law and ecological 
politics or law and the politics of critical legal theory – is not substantively addressed. 
It is instead identified as a conflation to be cleared away and dismissed as an 
obstacle that obfuscates scholarship and prevents the clear acquisition of 
knowledge. A scientist speaks and is heard. Behind this subtle misdirection, we can 
finally visualise in stark terms what drives the fear and aversion to theory amongst 
legal circles. It is not just the fear of being dragged towards either of the two well-
understood dangerous extremes of ‘dilettantism’ and ‘single-minded pursuit of an 
end’;34 it is rather an obsession with impact agendas and prestigious social roles for 
the profession in the challenging context for universities and public research. And the 
lure of the turn to epistemology is that it offers a calming solution, even for those still 
enticed by critical legal theory: replace the latter obsession with an obsession over 
method. Thus, even somewhat adventurous legal researchers can choose to stay on 
the middle path between the two extremes, without sabotaging their careers, 
                                            
34 Feldman, 502-503. 
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surreptitiously satisfying their cravings for theory with morsels of theoretical 
framework at the initial stage of their research projects. 
The rest of the chapter turns to the perceived malaise itself that causes such 
consternation to environmental law to examine whether such fear is founded. It is 
guided by the following questions: What type of knowledge constitutes ‘good’ and 
safe theory that can support mature legal scholarship, but also lead to effective 
action? How is the latter term to be defined? What is the appropriate place for legal 
researchers in the social and political practices related to the environment? 
5. INTERVENTION: VISITING THE ‘TOOL BOX’ 
Michel Foucault is the most cited thinker amongst critical legal scholars and 
his sui generis historical-philosophical work is regarded in many legal scholarship 
quarters as one of the primary enablers of the malaise of ‘capital-T Theory’. This is 
odd, considering he rejected any notion of his work constituting an overarching and 
internally coherent theory, general method or system.35 He was reluctant ‘to be seen 
as a philosophical monument’,36 and was also suspicious of the controlling morality 
of ‘our bureaucrats and our police’ or the ordering of the specialised academic 
                                            
35 See Foucault’s own interview remarks: ‘Perhaps the reasons why my work irritates people is 
precisely the fact that I am not interested in constructing a new schema or in validating one that 
already exists. Perhaps it is because my objective is not to propose a global principle for analysing 
society’ in Michel Foucault, ‘Questions of Method’ in James D. Faubion (ed), Power: Essential works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984 : Vol 3 (New Press 2000), 237. 
36 David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (Vintage 1994), 450 
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disciplines being applied to either his life or his work.37 Due to this peculiar status, it 
is thus highly instructive to bring in the life and the work of Michel Foucault to the 
contestations outlined in the preceding sections over the status and role of theory in 
environmental law scholarship, and of that scholarship within society. 
Foucault took great pains to distance his work from his own privileged status 
as a recalcitrant charismatic leader of a theoretical turn (called at varied times 
postmodernism or poststructuralism). Nevertheless, a particular pernicious way that 
this distance has been frequently overcome by other scholars has been via the reach 
for the seductive metaphor of Foucault’s ‘toolbox’.38 This is the notion that his work 
constitutes a ‘box’ of theoretical instruments to pick and choose as needed for the 
scholar’s discipline and research project, and without paying attention to the whole of 
the box or the relation between the instruments. Foucaultian scholars (including of 
law) read into that particular proposal an excuse to absolve themselves of the 
laborious need for understanding ‘theoretical underpinnings’ and intellectual 
                                            
37 ‘Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our 
police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write’. Michel 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (A. M. Sheridan Smith tr, Routledge 2002), 19 
38 Michel Foucault, ‘Power and Strategies’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Pantheon Books 1980), 145; Michel Foucault, ‘Prisons et 
asiles dans le mecanisme de pouvoir’ in Daniel Defert and Francois Ewald (eds), Michel Foucault: 
Dits et Ecrits I 1954-1975 (Gallimard 2001), 1391. Some interview remarks regarding his work as a 
set of instruments that other scholars can use freely based on utility in their own domain became for 
years an excuse for poor scholarship.  
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lineages,39 and thus articulating neutered critiques predicated on stylised 
obscurantism, verbose mystification borne out of the inescapable limitations of 
translating his work, and the vogue of opaque neologisms. Such scholarship has 
only served to confirm the worst fears regarding the malaise of theory, heightening 
exasperated sensations of aversion. But the toolbox was never meant as a license to 
consume Foucault’s work for the purpose of one’s own scholarship by haphazardly 
chopping it into bite-size pieces for those too lazy to ‘chew’ properly or, in 
Nietzschean terms, ‘ruminate’.40 
In a panel discussion in June 2011, the participants of The Foucault Effect 
1991-2011 Conference held by the Birkbeck Centre for Law and Humanities listened 
to Daniel Defert discuss the origin of the term; it was Foucault’s favourite leather bar 
in New York.41 Given the exhilarating fascination with America that Foucault 
displayed according to his various biographers,42 one can perhaps see the infamous 
‘toolbox’ as an almost playful jest to American audiences that spiralled out of control 
in tandem with his popularity; Foucault’s very own ‘Paul is Dead’ myth. Details and 
                                            
39 E.g. ‘[t]hese tools have sometimes been used uncritically, without due attendance to their 
theoretical underpinnings’ in Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project 
for a Spatial History (Continuum 2001), 93. 
40 ‘If this text strikes anyone as unintelligible and far from easy listening, the blame, as I see it, does 
not necessarily rest with me. The text is clear enough, assuming in the first place, as I do, that one 
has put some effort into reading my earlier writings.’ See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of 
Morals (Oxford University Press 1996), Preface 1.8. 
41 Panel 1 discussion is available at: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2011/06/the-foucault-effect/. 
Last accessed: 24 July 2015. 
42 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault (Faber and Faber 1992), 314-316; James E. Miller, The Passion of 
Michel Foucault (Simon & Schuster 1993), 251-255 
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precision have often be subsumed under the weight of this myth. His often-cited 
comment that he writes ‘for users, not readers’43 is prefaced by the hope that his 
work would be useful – in this specific way, i.e. as a toolbox – to ‘an educator, a 
warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector’,44 but pointedly not to a fellow 
scholar. 
Gary Gutting highlights a discussion between Gilles Deleuze and Foucault45 
that outlines a different conception of the ‘tool box’ as specifically constituting a direct 
link between theory and practice, and not a methodological edict interpreted as 
directed at theory exclusively; or indeed a license for loose and postmodernist 
‘undisciplined’ theorisations.46 In this discussion, Deleuze, speaking in relation to the 
involvement of both philosophers in activism regarding the state of prisons in France 
during the 1970s, also conceives of ‘theory’ as a tool box. But his conception differs 
from simply constituting a methodological excuse for a particular form of theoretical 
scholarship: ‘It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, 
beginning with the theoretician himself… then the theory is worthless or the moment 
is inappropriate.’47 
He then further explains these comments by using the analogy, borrowed 
from Proust, of theory as ‘a pair of glasses directed to the outside’, as an instrument 
that – through its capacity to render visible – is used to develop a political position 
                                            
43 Foucault, ‘Prisons et asiles dans le mecanisme de pouvoir’, 1392 
44 Ibid, 1392 
45 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, ‘Intellectuals and Power’ in Sylvere Lotringer (ed), Foucault 
Live (Interviews, 1961-194) (Semiotext(e) 1989) 
46 Gary Genosko, Undisciplined Theory (Sage Publications 1998) 
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that argues for some form of social, political or ethical change. This understanding 
accords with Foucault’s earlier statement from the same discussion, that ‘theory 
does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice’.48 This 
conception also accords with Gutting’s observation that: ‘From the time of Sartre on, 
philosophy itself has been seen as a means of political engagement. The leading 
French philosophers think for the sake of acting, of transforming a society they find 
intolerable’.49 From the above, the tool box emerges at a connecting node between 
scholarship and action (or in Foucaultian vocabulary, between thought and practice), 
the latter understood as a type of emancipatory politics of change that theory serves 
to formulate. It is as a collection of instruments developed by the researcher to be 
used by the practitioner, the activist, the government etc. By extension, the goal of 
the scholar is to keep this toolbox stocked with new and useful instruments; and not 
to use it a shortcut for the simplification of his own work; in other words, not to use it 
as a type of theoretical framework. 
5.1 The Intellectual and the Expert 
In expanding this analysis of possible configurations of theory and practice, 
Foucault proposes two competing figures and roles for the Western ‘intellectual’, a 
term obviously now fallen out of favour – if it ever enjoyed much - in the context of 
Anglo-American cultural pragmatism, but clearly defined along political lines as ‘the 
person who utilises his knowledge, his competence, and his relation to truth in the 
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field of political struggles’.50 The first role is that of the ‘universal’ intellectual of the 
past; ‘he was heard, or purported to make himself heard, as the spokesman of the 
universal… something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all’.51 His 
‘sacralising mark’ was the act of writing as a ‘free subject’, i.e. outside ‘the state or 
capital’.52 After 20th century critical theory’s own fetishes contributed to making this 
figure, whose exemplar was Voltaire, disappear from Western society, the second 
figure to emerge was that of the ‘specific’ intellectual, professionally placed within 
academia and deriving his privileged position from his scientific knowledge and/or 
technical expertise.53 According to Foucault’s analysis of this role, the exemplars of 
this latter figure were the post-Second World War atomic scientist, Robert 
Oppenheimer, but also Charles Darwin. ‘The death of the intellectual coincides with 
the rise of the expert.’54 
The legal field is a crucial node for distinguishing between the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’, between the ‘writer of genius’ and the ‘absolute savant’.55 The universal 
intellectual relied on the universality of the ideals of justice, right and the constitution 
– universally recognisable values that he (among the many fetishes, gender featured 
prominently) bore in his writings — to oppose the sovereign and challenge the 
abuses of power. An essentially uncritical and unacknowledged nostalgia for such a 
                                            
50 Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, 128 
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52 Ibid, 127 
53 Ibid, 128 
54 Douzinas, 195 
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role has proven to be, at least in part according to some,56 the downfall of the British 
branch of critical legal theory. For critical legal scholars quick to play the role of the 
victim, it is worthwhile to remember that the aversion to theory is not solely 
pragmatically-driven distaste for this universal, but not professionally trained, jurist 
that did not follow the scientific model of legal enquiry, but also for the necromantic 
attempts of critical legal theory to resurrect the corpse of something long dead. The 
era of these intellectuals is over. 
Foucault then describes the ‘specific’ intellectual that instead intervenes 
politically on the basis of his expert access to a scientific truth that is not universal, 
but particular to a specific and localised political conflict, social issue, public debate, 
activist campaign etc., in which he is intervening. By consequence, it is not the 
morality or values he represents, but the access to scientific truth and knowledge at 
his disposal that makes him out as someone whose discourse is true and valid; 
someone who, as an expert, can recommend practical reforms. In Foucault’s famous 
words, the intellectual is ‘no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist of 
life and death.’57 It is thus quite clear which of the two functions the turn to 
epistemology highlighted in this chapter is pointing towards. Methodology aims to 
guarantee the scientific credentials of environmental law researchers that would 
enable them to speak as ‘specific’ intellectuals, i.e. as experts. 
When Foucault presents his work as a theoretical toolbox made for ‘users’, he 
is in fact casting himself in a role that approximates that of the specific, as opposed 
to the universal, intellectual, the expert contributing based on his extensive 
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knowledge of specific problems, such as those related to prisons and clinics. When 
the function of the toolbox is instead misinterpreted, a type of misbegotten theoretical 
scholarship emerges by modelling itself after a misconceived and nostalgic image of 
Foucault and his interlocutors and followers as misunderstood universal intellectuals 
living out of time. The result often displays all the characteristic tropes of arcane and 
obfuscating ‘capital-T’ theory. 
It is easy to see why such anachronism emerges as snap reaction to the 
hostility towards theory. To associate some form of pure critical theory with the 
universal intellectual, and then deride the expert for his perceived hyper-
specialisation, his co-optation within the marketplace of ideas, or indeed his 
unacknowledged scientism,58 is indeed theoretical scholarship’s very own attempt at 
purification, near equivalent to the turn to epistemology. It certainly absolves the 
scholar from having to reflect on the social context and standing of his research, and 
infantilises him by protecting him through a warm blanket made from dense and 
abstract ‘theorising’. The atavistic image of the theorist as a member of an insular 
and arcane intellectual society  - that critical legal theory at times cultivates – is, in 
the last instance, still supporting the modern binary between basic science (theory) 
and applied technology (practice) that Foucault sought to overcome through both his 
work and his life. 
Turning back to environmental scholarship in general, and its descent from 
the modern environmental movement, it is instructive to remember that it has always 
been a field constructed by the discourse of the expert, rather than the universal 
intellectual. The early figures and leaders, such as Rachel Carson or Barry 
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Commoner, of the movement were concerned scientists; they followed in the 
footsteps of Oppenheimer. This should not constitute a source of quixotic refusals by 
critical environmental law or febrile acquiesces by legal researchers anxious to avoid 
being affected by the malaise of theory. 
5.2 The Regime of Truth 
And in acceptance lies the rub of the Foucaultian perspective once one take 
into account the function of the infamous ‘tool box’. Acceptance of the role of the 
expert is to be combined with a continuing reflection and critique of the functions of 
this role, of what the role contributes to the toolbox of change. This is reflection on 
the relation between scholarship and action itself, and precisely neither the 
prescribed inoculation of the erstwhile critical theorist with necessary doses of 
scientism or economicism per the turn to methodology or epistemology (identified in 
the beginning of this chapter) nor the infantile refusal of the committed critical 
theorist to address his position within the society he is seeking to affect (identified in 
the preceding section). 
Such reflection can be achieved through the examination of the different 
conceptions of truth at play in the expert interventions that occur at the border 
between scholarship and action. According to Foucault, ‘truth isn’t the reward of free 
spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only 
by virtue of multiple forms of constraint’.59 What Foucault called the ‘politics of truth’ 
refers to the political operation of a regime of truth, meaning the mechanisms by 
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which true and false discourses are distinguished and operate as such, the methods 
by which truth is acquired, and indeed the status and credentials required for those 
experts that are identified as speaking the truth,60 which is highly relevant to this 
chapter’s discussion of the role of environmental law scholarship. It is these politics 
of truth that e.g. prioritise natural sciences and economics over theory as discourses 
capable of addressing environmental problems, as long as the truths of science and 
economics can be incorporated into mature legal scholarship using a well thought-
out method. 
Consequently, the expert, in addition to his place as a researcher within the 
university or other institutions, also occupies a position within this broader regime of 
truth that exists in society. The battle for truth exists as a political conflict ‘around 
truth’, and scientific truth does not equate political truth. This is not a conflict over the 
scientific truths to be ‘proven’ e.g. the reality of climate change, biodiversity loss or 
pollution, but over the political and economic realisation of such truths that have 
attained sufficient status within society’s regime of truth.61 In this way, the line that 
divides scientific and political truth, and consequently scholarship and action, is 
purposefully blurred in this Foucaultian schema, as the researcher continues to 
navigate and overcome the binary relation between the two. It is certain however that 
if the expert is interested is fermenting any type of change, as most outspoken 
interventions by environmental scholars, legal or otherwise, aspire to, then it is no 
use harking back to the retro fashion of the universal intellectual speaking truth 
against power. The intervention instead needs to address and challenge the politics 
of the regimes of truth. 
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To prepare for such an intervention, the role of the researcher within the 
regime of truth is to be apprehended and analysed historically. For Foucault, 
historicism is generally one of the most useful instruments of critical scholarship62– a 
directly political instrument that straddles scholarship and action; it is the constitution 
of a historico-political field, a strategic mapping of the relations of force and their 
disposition in the battle for truth.63 This map of the conflicts over what is called truth 
is an invaluable instrument for the expert that both seeks to investigate the 
production of truth about existing orders and systems, as well as have input on their 
future evolution – or indeed revolution. In Foucaultian scholarship, history ‘becomes 
the tool par excellence for challenging and analysing existing orders’.64 It is proposed 
here that this includes the order that exists between scholarship and action. 
Therefore, it is through history that the limits of both thought and practice are to be 
located by the scholar seeking to furnish new forms of action. 
Following the above Foucaultian insights, the next section begins the 
necessary historical analysis regarding the descent of the present relation between 
environmental law scholarship and action, focusing on its currently favourable 
disposition towards the epistemological turn. Based on these historical findings, the 
final section aims to provide some helpful points of departure to environmental law 
researchers, who are entering the field during a period of generalised, and multi-
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level, aversion to theory, but who also sense theory as something more than a 
methodological choice related to early stages of research design. 
6. ANAMNESIS: ON THE HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF ‘LAW AND ENVIRONMENT’ 
STUDIES 
If the field of enquiry is best identified in the broadest terms as ‘law and 
environment studies’, as esteemed scholars such as Patricia Birnie, Richard 
Macrory, Alan Boyle and others have frequently veered towards, then it would follow 
logically that the overarching object of analysis would be the relation itself between 
law and nature, following the intellectual tradition of ‘law and…’ studies. Instead, the 
way the methodological turn transitions into the defence of the authority of the legal 
researcher as another type of environmental expert makes it apparent that the 
principal object of study is rather thought to be the type and level of applied 
assistance that law should render to the task of addressing serious contemporary 
environmental challenges; from the Foucaultian perspective identified above, the 
goal may be understood as making a contribution to the toolbox of 
environmentalism. 
Those two aims are connected, but they are not identical. Scholars 
increasingly do cast themselves into the role of the ‘problem-solving doctors’,65 
turning law into ‘a plug and play instrument that is expected to deliver certain 
results’,66 abandoning the notion of studying law and nature or the environment 
altogether. But the very ambivalence of rejecting this direction in the name of pure 
scholarship, while also relying on it for professional recognition as an expert who is 
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to be listened can be disorienting, and explains to an extent the fraught relationship 
between environmental law scholarship and environmental politics. At the core of 
this relationship is the perception of change. Thus, a contradiction often alluded to 
can now finally emerge: Is environmental law the study of change or the study of 
how to change? And which of the two pathways is preferable for the aspiring 
researcher? 
The engagement with such questions brings the analysis back to the general 
aversion towards theory in the legal field charted in the beginning of this chapter. In 
addressing these questions, environmental lawyers run into the perceived dangers of 
political bias or irrelevancy, ‘single-minded pursuit’ or ‘dilettantism’. These are very 
similar to some of the perceived dangers of critical theory associated with the 
spectre of the universal intellectual; dangers that the methodological/epistemological 
turn seeks to mitigate. First, the impartial and scientific nature of environmental law 
scholarship is in constant danger of being co-opted by various political biases and 
actions, against which the mature environmental law scholar must immunise, in the 
tradition of the best natural scientists. As regards the danger of irrelevance, this is 
mitigated by mimicking the fragmented structure of issue-specific environmental 
regulatory regimes. Hyper-specialised scholarship in a single isolated area67 – often 
divided according to environmental media – such as marine pollution or climate 
change, is lamented as leading to the ‘balkanisation of scholarly expertise’.68 But that 
very lament contains the reason for the persistence of this mimicry in environmental 
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legal thought: it also creates environmental experts, with access to a type of a 
scientific truth and capable of being listened to. 
A closer look at the history of environmental law scholarship itself (as 
opposed to environmental law) sheds further light on the formulation of the object of 
study and the possible origin of the contradiction identified above. Richard Macrory, 
the first professor of environmental law appointed at a British University, recounts 
how, in the process of starting out as an environmental law lecturer in the 1980s, he 
discovered a ‘sympathetic and intellectually stimulating academic environment’ in the 
environmental sciences rather than in a ‘traditional law school’.69 Significant national 
environmental legislation, such as the Control of Pollution of Act 1974, even 
predates the period that Macrory refers to. Across the Atlantic, David Driesen 
recounts how the reception of the same, unrevised article on international 
environmental law by North American law reviews shifted from blanket rejection to 
wide interest in the space of one year; from 1989 to 1990.70 The US National 
Environment Policy Act 1969 predates Driesen’s experience by twenty years, as well 
as most environmental law journals and reviews, such as the Ecology Law Quarterly 
and the Harvard Environmental Law Review amongst others. Richard Lazarus, 
writing in 1999 and examining only the US legal scholarship of the previous three 
decades, observes that in relation to mainstream law journals ‘the paucity of 
published scholarship stands in sharp contrast to environmental law’s remarkable 
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and dramatic emergence’.71 Expanding this series of observations further, the 
present author can add his personal past experience as a student of international 
environmental law that was taught that its origins are not to be found in the 1980s, 
but in the Trail Smelter arbitration or even earlier treaties from the late 19th and early 
20th century. 
Such observations unearth disjunctions swiftly (re)arranged into evolutionary 
historical schemas of environmental law. The latter often take the standard legal 
historiographical form of teleological evolution from classical, to modern and 
contemporary, ‘post-modern’ eras.72 These histories of the progress of 
environmental law subsume and conflate the legal scholarship aspect, partially 
confirming the argument of proponents of the methodological turn in environmental 
law about the need for separation. Alternatively, when these events remain 
unarranged and retain the character of personal anecdotes or recollections, as in the 
cases of some of the works cited above, then they usually convey a sense of 
maturation and achievement felt by the proud members of an academic discipline 
that went from non-existence to maturity in a relatively short time span of a few 
decades. 
From a Foucaultian perspective, the tendency to structure events into a linear, 
smooth and ‘continuist’ histories of maturity and progress in order to derive historical 
explanations should be resisted, because such structures are post-facto 
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rationalisations and orderings of their significance by historians.73 That is not to say 
that historical discontinuity, difference, anomaly and breaks should be fetishized74 
instead of continuity, structure, progress and maturity.75 It is simply that the former 
can also be usefully indicative of historical transformations of significance lost in the 
smooth evolutionist narrative of progress towards the present. 
Discontinuity is particularly useful tool for a scholarly field, such as 
environmental law, so intent on the study and pursuit of change. As indicated, 
perpetuating the notion of continuity enshrines a teleological understanding of 
history. In the case of environmental law, this understanding can either take the 
presentist attitude of legal history that seeks to re-order everything into a continuum 
of linear progress towards the contemporary moment or the idealist attitude of 
ecology as movement or its scientific utopia of a society underpinned by 
scientifically-derived norms; a world of ‘genetically accurate and hence completely 
fair code of ethics’.76 
By resisting such imposed historicisations, the observations of the authors 
that opened this section can have different implications. They can be seen to 
illuminate a reversal in the historical development of the legal epistemological field, 
between the start of the application of laws, at domestic and international levels, to 
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address environmental concerns and their subsequent recognition as a valid object 
of legal scholarship; action before scholarship, practice before thought. Although 
there is no space in this chapter to fully investigate the factors and context of this 
reversal, it represents a useful starting point for thinking about the role of the legal 
researcher as an environmental expert. 
As Macrory indicates, environmental law scholarship was initially a by-product 
of lawyers’ interest in and engagement with ecological issues, concerns and causes. 
In his words, the ‘sympathetic and intellectual environment’ was located within the 
environmental sciences, rather than the law school. One only needs to think about 
the double meaning of the term ecology (as both a science and a social movement) 
to understand the close connection between thought and practice. Therefore, the 
formative years of environmental law scholarship had to contend with a legacy of –at 
the very least – proposals for law and policy reforms (if not concrete actions taken) to 
address specific environmental issues. The history of environmental law is filled with 
such instances of seemingly putting the cart before the horse, overlooked by legal 
history’s commitment to perpetuating continuity within the legal field, as well between 
the development of scholarship and action. 
For example, the concept of biodiversity was first formulated in an 
administrative context by biologists contributing a chapter on species and other 
forms of ecological decline to an US government agency’s report.77 Seven years 
later, when biodiversity emerged as a popular ‘buzz-word’ at a highly interdisciplinary 
forum organised by the US National Research Councils and the Smithsonian 
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Institute, legal scholars remained absent.78 The concept remained under the control 
of specific scientific disciplines within North American academia. Only after the 
United Nations Environment Programme and the General Assembly authorised the 
start of negotiations for an international treaty on biodiversity conservation in 
preparation for the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development,79 did 
legal scholarship on biodiversity take off – coinciding with the recognition by law 
schools of environmental law as an academic field. 
This historical pattern has now become a conceptual pattern that steadily 
repeats itself; a modus operandi whereby environmental lawyers are to be ‘brought 
in’ to the later stages of ecological debates as essentially technical experts of sorts, 
tasked with supplying both authoritative and effective legal solutions to highly 
complex and increasingly dynamic environmental problems that often extend beyond 
national jurisdictions. This assigned role within environmentalism’s regime of truth 
might also go some way towards explaining the preoccupation with the twin dangers 
of ‘single-minded pursuit’ and ‘dilettantism’. Further evidence of the acceptance of 
this role can be found in the opening sections of most pieces of legal scholarship on 
any given environmental problem, where the theoretical clarity as to the nature of the 
problem at hand is delivered by reference to some pre-existing configuration of the 
science, ethics and economics underpinning the particular conception of that 
problem to be tackled by the legal scholar, in her process of ‘exploring the ways in 
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which law of whatever type can assist in meeting contemporary environmental 
challenges’.80 
There is of course far more to be analysed regarding the historical descent of 
this certain functionalism – viewed as the transformation of an ethical and political 
commitment to ecology into a commitment to goal-orientated scholarship – in this 
particular regime of truth. But this short snapshot – this short deployment of the 
political instrument of history writing – begins to illustrate the ease by which the 
regime’s operation can be discerned historically if its discontinuity is left ‘un-
smoothened’. Barely glancing at a historical reversal, we can already find traces of 
the current relationship between scholarship and action in environmental law as not 
something that has inevitably or consciously evolved over time to its present state, 
but something that contains the bitterness81 and struggle of the early years of 
academic environmental lawyers. The pattern can always fall into place in a different 
way; or it can be encouraged to do so by legal scholarship that refuses to play the 
role of the restricted technical expert of the last instance. 
7. ACCEPTANCE 
The preceding analysis may appear counter-intuitive or even contrarian to 
some readers. On the one hand, the methodological turn is critiqued as masked 
subservience to the scientific model and aversion to theory is dismissed as careerist 
co-optation, driven by the self-serving motivation to maintain the relevance of 
environmental law as field of expertise in our contemporary world. On the other 
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hand, theoretical scholarship is also indeed critiqued as a malaise identified by its 
flirtation with mystification and obscurantism; to add insult to injury, this critique is 
based on the work of Michel Foucault, frequently considered a source of much 
‘theory’ of variable levels of quality. 
The intention is twofold: to recover the Foucaultian perspective from some 
overzealous bundling together with critical legal theory, and to reconstruct its 
operation, as it relates to environmental law. It is not to advocate apathetic cynicism 
by suggesting that every avenue available to the inquisitive legal researcher is either 
blocked or pre-determined. It is not to reinforce the facile and binary fatalism of 
having to choose between adopting a careerist attitude and indulging a nostalgic 
fantasy. Quite simply, the erection of the strawman of the arcane critical theorist 
should not be met by the erection of the equivalent strawman of the co-opted expert. 
Beyond the counter-sneering, from both quarters, at irrelevancy or compromise, 
beyond the extremes of the scholar who is only validated when his work is quoted by 
a judge and the scholar who only feels sage when hiding behind the crutch of 
language, lies the acceptance of a difficult role – and responsibility – for 
environmental law to meaningfully contribute to the ‘tool box’ of environmental 
thought in the context of a scholarship that goes beyond legislative drafting, but 
equally does not lose all its tethers to the legal field. 
The lure of establishing a pure demarcation between ‘scholarly’ and applied 
environmental problems is attractive to all schools of legal thought on the 
environment. But it remains a lure. The multiple social and political functions of the 
very idea of purity are already known to anthropology.82 The links between notions of 
                                            
82 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (Routledge 
1991) 
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maturity in legal scholarship and methodological reflection, or between notions of 
malaise and critical legal theory, serve to control the relationship between 
scholarship and action. In the process, they detract from the task of addressing the 
larger challenge: environmental law exists to both study and manufacture change. 
The acceptance of the role of the expert requires demanding and constant reflection, 
responsibly navigating between scientific and political truth, on the multitudinous idea 
of change. 
The brief overview of the historical reversal between scholarship and action 
included in this chapter easily rendered visible this centrality, in the motivations for 
the emergence of the field itself. More detailed historical studies will of course be 
capable of unearthing much more of the field’s evolution and the operation of its 
regime of truth. But for now, we can posit that environmental law is a form of thought 
that does not fit neatly into the boxes of scholarship and action, theory and practice 
and so on. Whenever one of those boxes is isolated, irrespective whether it is by a 
policy expert, a doctrinal scholar, a sociolegal empiricist or an arcane critical theorist, 
a dangerous path is forged, eliding the difficult question of finding the right balance 
between studying and promoting change. 
Despite the best efforts at epistemological purity by way of method and 
theory, environmental law is still a study of change inveigled with the study of how to 
change; a circle that cannot be completed, an irreconcilable catch-22 disrupting the 
core of all these disciplinary labels and brand names that 21st century academics 
create for their little enterprising projects. Foucault was both a theorist and an expert 
in a way that critiqued the standard associations borne out of both labels. 
Transcending such labels should equally constitute the primary task of Foucault-
inspired legal scholarship on the environment.  
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